Colored minority games by Marsili, Matteo & Piai, Maurizio
ar
X
iv
:c
on
d-
m
at
/0
20
24
79
v1
  [
co
nd
-m
at.
sta
t-m
ec
h]
  2
6 F
eb
 20
02 Colored minority games
Matteo Marsili(1) and Maurizio Piai(2)
(1) Istituto Nazionale per la Fisica della Materia (INFM), Trieste-SISSA Unit, V.
Beirut 2-4, Trieste I-34014
(2) SISSA-ISAS, V. Beirut 2-4, Trieste I-3401 and Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nu-
cleare (INFN),sez. Trieste
1 Introduction
The Minority Game (MG) [1] provides an ideal playground for
studying interacting agent systems such as financial markets [2].
Its stationary states have indeed been understood in great de-
tail [3–5] whose conclusions have been recently confirmed by a
fully dynamic theoretical approach [6]. Such a state of the art
allows one to address interesting issues on the way in which such
complex systems behave.
The MG is a largely oversimplified model of a systems of adap-
tive agents. This characteristic is what makes the MG analyti-
cally tractable thus allowing one to derive a coherent picture of
its collective behavior. Then, it is important to understand how
this picture changes as one moves towards more realistic cases.
Several investigations have indeed aimed at relaxing the many
unrealistic features of the MG: The effect of non-adaptive agents
(also called producers or hedgers) has been studied in Ref. [2];
the role of market impact was addressed in Refs. [3,7,8] and dif-
ferently weighted agents were discussed in Ref. [9]. Agents who
can refrain from playing, if that is not convenient have also been
considered in Ref. [10–12]. The analytic theory offers insights on
these issues which allows one to form a far more complete picture
than that resulting only from numerical simulations [13].
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An unrealistic feature of the MG is that agents trade on the same
time-scales and that different events also occur with the same
frequency. Our aim in this note is to study how the collective be-
havior changes if one goes beyond such simplifying assumptions.
The MG is based on a syncronous dynamics. Every agent, at
each time trades in the market. In the real world agents trade
on different frequencies; some everyday, even several times in a
day, and some once a week, a month or an year. The distribution
of trading time-scales across agents may likely be spread over
several decades, which may offer an explaination for the presence
of long range correlations in the volume of financial activity [11].
How does the behavior of MG changes if we account for strategies
acting on different, even widely spread, frequencies?
We find that the qualitative behavior of the system is not affected.
Still a phase transition between an informationally efficient phase
and an inefficient phase exist. We quantify how the critical point
where the phase transition occurs depends on the distribution.
The second question we ask concerns the frequency with which
events occur. In the world of the MG one of many possible events
occur in each period. Agents observe these events and indeed they
adopt strategies which provide actions conditional to events. All
events in the MG occur with the same probability. In section 4 we
study a situation where events occur with different probabilities.
Our discussion builds up on results derived in [14]. In particular
we address the issue of information efficiency.
When the market is not informationally efficient, one may in-
vestigate market predictability as a function of the frequency of
events. We find that markets are more predictable when rare
events occur than when typical events occur. In particular the
asymmetry of market outcome in a given state is inversely pro-
portional to the frequency of that state. This gives a frequency-
dependent characterization of market (in)efficiency.
When comparing these results with real market data, one faces
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the problem of identifying relevant events. We discuss a simple
example based on FX data. Average returns of the FX rate are
conditioned to events which, as in the the original MG, encode
the information on the M most recent market movements. Our
evidence is not strong but it points in the right direction: The
market is more predictable when rare events occur.
2 The Minority Game
The MG depicts a market with N adaptive agents or speculators.
The market can be in one of P states, labelled by µ in the follow-
ing. Each trader i has two personal trading strategies, labeled by
a spin variable si, which prescribe an action a
µ
si,i for each state
µ. These trading strategies are drawn at random from a certain
distribution (see later) and assigned to agents.
The game is repeated many times; at time t the state µ(t) is
drawn from a distribution ρµ at each time and agents try to esti-
mate, on the basis of past observations, which of their strategies
is the best one. To do this, agents assign a score Us,i(t) to each
strategy s = ±1. The larger the score of a strategy, the more
likely it will be played by the agent: If si(t) is the strategy played
by agent i at time t we assume that
Prob[si(t) = s] ∝ exp [ΓUs,i(t)] (1)
where Γ is a learning rate. Each agent monitors the scores Us,i(t)
of each of her strategies s by
Us,i(t+ 1) = Us,i(t)− aµ(t)s,i A(t)/N, A(t) =
∑
j
a
µ(t)
sj(t),j
. (2)
This dynamics implies that agents prefer to take actions with the
opposite sign to that of A(t). Indeed they reward by increasing
Us,i the score of a strategy s for which a
µ(t)
s,i A(t) < 0. If only
binary actions aµs,i = ±1 are allowed, then A(t) has the sign of
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the action taken by the majority. Hence the minority “wins”. We
refer the interested reader to Refs. [1,9,15] for deeper discussions
on the interpretation of this dynamics.
The relevant parameter [16] is the ratio
α = P/N
between the “information complexity” P and the number of agents,
and the key quantity we shall look at is
σ2 = 〈A2〉
where 〈. . .〉 is a time average in the stationary state. σ2 is a
measure of the inefficiency of agents’ coordination because. Hence
optimal states correspond to minima of σ2.
A further interesting quantity is the predictability
H =
P∑
µ=1
ρµ〈A|µ〉2 (3)
of the market. Here 〈. . . |µ〉 is a conditional average in the state µ.
If the average 〈A|µ〉 of A(t) conditional to µ(t) = µ is non-zero,
then the sign of A(t) is statistically predictable if µ is known.
This is why H measures predictability.
Previous works have mainly focused on strategies drawn from the
distribution
P (aµs,i) =
1
2
δ(aµs,i + 1) +
1
2
δ(aµs,i − 1) (4)
(a correlation between the two trading strategies has also been
considered[2]) and on the event distribution
ρµ =
1
P
. (5)
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The collective behavior of the market is the following: For α > αc
the market is predictable (H > 0), the stationary state is unique
and independent of the learning rate Γ. As α decreases from large
values, also σ2 decreases signalling that agents manage to coor-
dinate more and more efficiently. At α = αc a phase transition
occurs. Indeed for α < αc the market is unpredictable (H = 0),
the stationary state is not unique but rather depends both on the
initial conditions and on the learning rate. For symmetric initial
conditions (Us,i(0) = 0 ∀s, i), σ2 reaches a minimum at αc and
then it starts raising as α decreases below αc. In this region σ
2 is
also an increasing function of Γ. The inefficiency σ2 also decreases
as a function of the asymmetry of initial conditions. For strongly
asymmetric initial conditions (e.g. U+,i(0) ≫ U−,i(0), ∀i) σ2 is
greatly reduced and it decreases with α.
Such a complex behavior can be captured and described quan-
titatively by a statistical mechanics approach [5] based on two
steps: First one studies the stationary state properties of the sys-
tem and secondly one studies the stochastic dynamics. Here we
discuss how this picture changes when either of Eqs. (4,5) is mod-
ified to allow for agents acting or events occurring on different
frequencies.
3 Agents trading on different time-scales
Let us assume that agent i plays with a frequency fi. More pre-
cisely we assume that
P (aµs,i) = fi
[
1
2
δ(aµs,i + 1) +
1
2
δ(aµs,i − 1)
]
+ (1− fi)δ(aµs,i). (6)
This means that on a fraction 1−fi of the events, agent i does not
trade (aµs,i = 0). Different agents play with different frequencies,
and are not supposed to respect any rigid time-table. We assume
fi to be fixed at the beginning of the game, sorting it randomly
on the basis of a given distribution ν(f). In order to describe the
5
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Fig. 1. Phase diagram in the (α, γ) plane. The shaded region below the curve αc(γ) is
the efficient (symmetric) phase. The dashed line corresponds to αc(∞) ≈ 0.3374 . . .
lack of a single characteristic time-scale, we will mainly consider
the distribution
ν(f) = γ f γ−1, (7)
so that the system is now described by two parameters γ and
α. In the limit γ → ∞ we recover the case in which all players
are supposed to act at each run of the game. Following Ref. [5],
we find that the stationary state “magnetizations” mi = 〈si〉 are
coincide with the minima of H where, in Eq. 3,
〈A|µ〉 =
N∑
i=1

aµ+,i + aµ−,i
2
+mi
aµ+,i − aµ−,i
2

 .
The properties of the stationary states are then accessible using
standard methods of statistical mechanics of disordered systems.
The approach follows exactly the same steps as those of Refs.
[3,2]. As detailed in the appendix, the main difference concerns
the disorder average of the replicated partition function that is
now taken with Eq. (6) and not with Eq. (4). Furthermore one has
to average over the distribution ν(f). Details of the calculations
are reported in the appendix.
The system behaves in a non-trivial way, presenting a phase tran-
sition in the (γ, α) plane as shown in figure 1). This separates an
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informationally inefficient phase with H > 0 – for α > αc(γ)
– from an efficient phase (H = 0) for α < αc(γ). As expected
when γ → ∞ we recover the value of the critical threshold
αc ≈ 0.3374 . . . of the mono-chromatic MG [3]. For finite val-
ues of α we find a smaller value of αc. This is consistent with
the observation that a smaller number of agents are active in the
market at each time.
When γ → 0 the critical threshold αc(γ) vanishes. This is con-
sistent with the observation that in such a market the effective
number of trader is a vanishing fraction of N .
Concerning agent’s behavior we find that the distribution of mag-
netization m conditional to the frequency f is given by:
P (m|f) = 1
2
φ(f) [δ(m+ 1) + δ(m− 1)] + ζf√
2pi
e−(ζfm)
2/2 (8)
where ζ = ζ(α, γ) is a parameter which depends on α and γ (see
appendix) and
φ(f) = erfc
(
ζf√
2
)
.
is the probability that an agent with fi = f is frozen, i.e. that
he/she plays always the same strategy (mi = ±1). Hence agents
who play less frequently (small fi) are more likely to be frozen.
This is reasonable because it is the market impact [4] which makes
agents switch between strategies and agents who trade less fre-
quently are less affected by the market impact.
Most of the noise traders – i.e. of the agents with mi ≈ 0 – are
frequent traders: It is not difficult to see that the probability that
a trader with mi ≈ 0 has frequency fi = f is Prob(fi = f |mi ≈
0) ∝ f γ.
The main conclusion of this section is that, even with a broad
distribution of trading time-scales across agents, the basic picture
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of the behavior of the MG remains that of the mono-chromatic
MG. We also see that frequent traders are responsible for market
volatility.
4 Broadly distributed frequency of events
In this section we address the behavior of a market, as described
by the MG, when the basic events have a broad distribution of
frequencies. In other words, instead of Eq. (5) we consider
ρµ =
1
P
τµ (9)
with τµ distributed with a pdf θ(τ) such that
∞∫
0
θ(τ)τdτ = 1
which ensures normalization of ρµ in Eq. (9). Now there will be
events which occur more frequently than others with a spread of
frequencies which depends on the distribution θ(τ).
The solution of the MG with a generic ρµ has been discussed in
detail in Ref. [14]. Here we pick the main results:
The predictability can be written as
H =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
τµ〈A|µ〉2 ∼=
∞∫
0
dτθ(τ)τ〈A|τ〉2
where 〈A|τ 〉2 is the average predictability of events with fre-
quency τ . This quantity can be read off from Eq. (C2) of Ref.
[14], which reads:
H
N
=
1 +Q
2
∞∫
0
dτθ(τ)
τ
(1 + τχ)2
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where χ and Q are given in appendix 4.1. From these equations
we find that the typical asymmetry |〈A|τ 〉| that one can expect
on events with frequency τ is
|〈A|τ〉| =
√√√√1 +Q
2
1
1 + τχ
. (10)
The quantity |〈A|τ 〉| measures the maximal excess return that a
trader can possibly exploit by trading on events at time-scale τ .
In a market where agents behave randomly (mi = 0 for all i) we
expect |〈A|τ 〉| to be independent of τ . Eq. (10) shows that traders
activity exploits more heavily arbitrages on frequent events thus
reducing |〈A|τ 〉|. The result of this is that, for frequent events
(τχ ≫ 1), the excess return is inversely proportional the proba-
bility τ/P of events.
Because the number of traders is finite and their ability of detect-
ing and exploiting arbitrages is bounded, rare events (τχ ≈ 1)
carry arbitrages which are left unexploited. There is a charac-
teristic frequency 1/χ below which the law |〈A|τ〉| ∼ 1/τ levels
off: For rare events ρµ < 1/(χP ) arbitrage size remains constant,
suggesting that traders are unable to optimize their behavior at
a time resolution smaller than 1/χ.
In the limit α → α+c the market becomes efficient so |〈A|τ 〉| →
0. At the same time, however χ → ∞ which means that the
|〈A|τ 〉| ∼ 1/τ behavior extends to extremely rare events.
Fig. 2 shows that numerical simulations are in full agreement with
Eq. (10). This plot in particular allows one to measure χ from
market data. This in turn provides a measure of the inefficiency
of the market.
4.1 Efficiency in real markets
Let us discuss a practical application to the above results to real
market data. There are two main sources of problems: First it
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Fig. 2. Excess return |〈A|µ〉| as a function of τµ from numerical simulations of
sistems with P = 256 events, α = 0.4 and 1.0. The simulation used θ(τ) = aτ−1/3
for τ < τ>. The full lines are numerical fits with the functional form A/(1 + χτ).
is not clear how to identify a set of exclusive events. Events are
specified in the very definition of the MG but it is not clear what
are their counterparts in a real market.
Second one faces the problem of handling a finite data set. Sup-
pose that we have T data points and that, having identified a set
of events, we define µ(t) as the label of the event which occurs in
observation t = 1, . . . , T . Then our estimate ˆ〈A|µ〉 of the market
return conditional to event µ will be
ˆ〈A|µ〉 = 1
T µ
T∑
t=1
δµ,µ(t)A(t), T
µ =
T∑
t=1
δµ,µ(t).
This will however be affected by statistical errors of the order
δ ˆ〈A|µ〉 ≃
√
V µ/T µ,
where V µ is the sample variance, conditional to µ(t) = µ. One
should then require that ˆ〈A|µ〉 ≫ δ ˆ〈A|µ〉, i.e. that the results
are statistically significant. This means that market data should
be classified in a number of events as small as possible. However
grouping different market conditions in the same state µ may
average out relevant information.
We illustrate these points with a specific example. We analyzed
10
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Fig. 3. Conditional excess returns |〈A|µ〉| as a function of the frequancy fµ in FX
markets. For a definition of events Eµ see Refs. [17,18].
a data set of FX data on the USD-DEM exchange rate for the
year 1993 [17]. Considering a typical time interval of 5 minutes,
this gives T ≈ 105 points. We define event µ, as in the original
MG, as the encoding of the M most recent signs of the FX rate
increments [18]. Taking M = 4, i.e. P = 16 events, we find the
results of Fig. 3. The error on ˆ〈A|µ〉 is reported as a dashed line in
Fig. 3. The evidence for the law |〈A|µ〉| ∼ 1/τµ is very weak and
hardly emerges from the noise level. In other words, one cannot
rule out the hypothesis that 〈A|µ〉 = 0 and that what is seen is
just fluctuations due to finite sample size. Furthermore there is
no evidence of saturation for rare events. This is consistent with
the fact that FX markets are very efficient and hence one expects
a fairly large value of χ.
The present statistical resolution does not allow for sharp state-
ments on the inefficiency of FX-markets. It serves however to il-
lustrate the practical issues that such an empirical analysis raises.
Appendix
We give here some results of the algebraic manipulation of the
model defined in section 3, and the final equation, to be solved
numerically. In order to study the minima of H, as usual one
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introduces a fictitious temperature β and builds the partition
function Z(β) = Trme
−βH . In order to deal with quenched dis-
order (i.e. with the heterogeneity of agents’ trading strategies)
we resort to the replica trick [19]. This amounts in averaging the
parition function Zn(β) of n copies of the system over the disor-
der and then taking the limit n→∞. This allows one to compute
the disorder average of logZ(β) which is a self-averaging quan-
tity. It is easy to see [3] that the resulting free-energy is correctly
described by a simple replica symmetric (RS) ansatz, i.e.
1
N
〈logZ(β)〉 ≃ −βf
where
f =
α
2β
[
ln (1 +
βγ
α(γ + 2)
(Q− q)) + β(1 + q)
α(γ + 2)/γ + β(Q− q)
]
+
α
2β
[QR− qr]− 1
β
1
0
df γ f γ−1
〈
lnTrm exp (− βfVz(m|f))
〉
z
,
where
Q=
N∑
ı=1
f 2i m
2
i/
N∑
ı=1
f 2i
q=
N∑
ı=1
f 2i mim
′
i/
N∑
ı=1
f 2i
Vz(m|f)=−γ + 2
γ
αβf
2
(R − r)m2 −
√
(γ + 2)αr/γzm.
Here mi and m
′
i refer to two distinct replicas of the system. Fi-
nally R and r arise as Langrange multipliers. The analysis of the
saddle point equations follows the usual steps (see e.g. the ap-
pendics of Refs. [4,2]). The limit β → 0 has to be taken in the
end. The solution can be expressed in parametric form in terms
of a variable ζ:
Q= q
12
Q=1− (γ + 2)
1∫
0
dff γ+1


√√√√2
pi
e−f
2ζ2/2
fζ
+
(
1− 1
f 2ζ2
)
erf
(
fζ√
2
)
and
1 +Q =
γ + 2
γ
α
ζ2
.
The critical threshold αc is as usual [3,4,2,5] derived imposing
that the fraction of non-frozen agents is qual to α:
1∫
0
[1− φ(f)]γf γ−1df =
1∫
0
erf
(
fζ√
2
)
γf γ−1df = α.
These equations can be easily solved numerically.
The analytic solution of the MG with generic distribution ρµ is
described in Ref. [14] and follows the same lines as above. The
parameters χ = β(Q − q)/α and Q are given by the solution of
the set of equations:
Q=1−
√√√√2
pi
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
−
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
α(1 +Q)〈 τ
2
[1 + τχ]2
〉τ =

erf(ζ/
√
2)
χζ


2
〈 τχ
1 + τχ
〉τ =
erf(ζ/
√
2)
α
where 〈. . .〉τ = ∫∞0 dτθ(τ) . . .. These equations are valid in the
symmetric phase (α > αc). χ diverges at the critial point, where
αc = erf(ζ/
√
2).
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